**Poliovirus Outbreak Response Assessment (OBRA)**

The scope and timing have been revised in version 2 to reflect changes in the program and after feedback from WHO and UNICEF regional and country teams

**Purpose:** To assess whether vaccination and surveillance response is robust enough to detect and stop poliovirus transmission, and what is needed to address gaps. Polio OBRA are to be timely, effective, practical and independent

### Objectives:

1. **Assess and strengthen efforts to increase immunization coverage and population immunity**
   - This is priority when transmission ongoing
   - Assess vaccine management for each round

2. **Assess early progress towards interrupting transmission**
   - Root cause(s) of outbreak understood
   - Outbreak SOPs being implemented in a timely and effective manner

3. **Assess and strengthen surveillance sensitivity**
   - Assess efforts to enhance surveillance in outbreak context beyond baseline activities
   - Assess sustainability of surveillance system

### Overview of assessment:

**Planning**

- OBRA planning begins at outbreak confirmation
- GPEI Outbreak Preparedness and Response Task Team (OPRTT), including WHO and UNICEF Regional Offices leads global level coordination for OBRA support
- External desk review (EDR) organized by the OPRTT and RO to review of all relevant data will replace subsequent OBRA
- Partners identify independent OBRA team leader early
- Team expertise includes immunization, surveillance, C4D, vaccine management, and others as needed
- Conduct teleconference between OBRA team and the country 2 weeks before the OBRA to discuss situation analysis (e.g. previous reviews) and preparations

**Report and debrief**

- Team presents findings and recommendations to authorities before leaving the country, and reports on:
  - Implementation of previous recommendations
  - Additional assessments undertaken (e.g. routine immunization, cold chain, micro plans, surveillance, etc.)
  - Whether available evidence supports that poliovirus transmission was interrupted and if follow-up assessment is necessary.
  - Alignment with IHR recommendations.
  - Where type 2 monovalent oral polio vaccine (mOPV2) was used, complete inventory, and recommended safe storage or destruction of any remaining stock

**Scope and Timing**

- First OBRA: comprehensive assessment 3-4 months from virus notification. 5-10 external evaluators for up to 10 days. Assessing timeliness and quality of response activities. Identifying gaps that need to be addressed
- Follow-up program desk review, 6-9 months from last detected isolate. Evaluating evidence that transmission has been interrupted, assessing sensitivity of surveillance and identifying gaps that need to be addressed.
- Team numbers and composition to be adjusted for country and outbreak context.
- Extended outbreaks may warrant intermediate OBRA or desk reviews, as appropriate.

**End of Outbreak**

- If the ‘end of outbreak’ criteria (page 3) are not met in a country or zone, the OPRTT and RO will recommend next steps:
  - At 6 months without virus detected: strengthen internal / external support for response; continue EDRs
  - At 9 to 12 months without virus detected: put in place a 3-month emergency plan for a) surveillance, e.g. intense active case search in outbreak area; b) immunization, e.g. proven or innovative strategies for SIAs and routine immunization (RED approach); repeat EDR after 3 months, or as appropriate.
- When criteria are met and/or the ERD finds that outbreak response has been sufficient, the WHO regional office considers evidence, shares the EDR report with the national and regional certification commissions and may confirm the outbreak is over and can be ‘closed’.

### Special circumstances:

- Safe storage or destruction of any remaining stock
- Assess and strengthen surveillance sensitivity
- Assess efforts to enhance surveillance in outbreak context beyond baseline activities
- Assess sustainability of surveillance system

- Focus, scope and emphasis of assessment will evolve with each OBRA for any event or outbreak, the time since the last poliovirus isolate, and local circumstances, as reflected in specific terms of reference for each assessment.
### Endemic countries: OBRAs follow same principles, country EOC to be involved in planning

### Multi-country outbreak zone, countries without cases but with vaccination response Focus on:
- Response quality / population immunity
- AFP and environmental surveillance
- Enhanced case / isolate detection
- Analysis of chronically missed communities/children

**Criteria to determine if an outbreak is over**

### Multi-country outbreak zone, countries without cases, no vaccination response conducted. Focus on:
- Enhanced surveillance, case detection, active search and environmental sampling
- Areas bordering outbreak country, mobile population

### Assessment of programme areas (technical worksheets and data collection tools available separately)

#### Focus primarily on high risk areas and populations:
- History of infection or higher likelihood of missed transmission, areas of poor surveillance or immunity
- Special populations, such as conflict affected or displaced, border areas, mobile populations including migrants and nomads, minorities or underserved

#### Planning and coordination
- Declaration of health emergency; cross border notification and collaboration when applicable
- Technical committees formed and active
- Presence of comprehensive response plans, with budget, to reach every child with vaccination and to strengthen surveillance
- Timely request, receipt, and disbursement of funds

#### SIA quality and monitoring
- Preparedness timeline, microplanning, training, vaccines, supplies and funding (adequacy, timeliness, vaccine management knowledge and skills)
- Documentation quality (tally sheets, vaccine management tools, survey materials)
- Detailed plans for and availability of supervisors
- Reporting (timeliness, completeness), review meetings, and feedback (to levels above and below)
- Independent monitoring before, during and after campaigns with feedback / Coverage monitoring /LQAS

#### Advocacy, communication and C4D
- Assessment of communication plans for SIAs and RI, including integration with microplans
- Use lessons learned and prior experience; strategies to reach missed children; timing of sensitization; communication training for community health workers (e.g. on RI and SIA)

#### B. Population immunity & routine immunization (RI)
- OPV and IPV coverage (OPV3 in last 3 years and available surveys/studies) in general and special populations; trend analysis, sustainability of immunization coverage
- Vaccine supply chain, evidence of stockouts / shortages
- Identify populations with limited access, refugees, etc; Describe refusals and health-seeking behaviours.
- Implement mobile teams and targeted strategies

#### C. Surveillance, data quality & laboratory
- NPAFP and stool adequacy indicators at lowest admin level possible (at least 100,000 children <15 years); proportion of stool samples collected within 14 days of onset, 60-day follow-up for cases with inadequate samples
- Facility selection: system, frequency, and priority setting, mix of public, private, large and smaller facilities
- Community and contact sampling protocols and practise
- Records of supervisory visits and reports, training and reporting, commitment, knowledge at all levels visited
- Sabin-like virus in stools or in the environment and /or VDPV emergence after campaigns
- Laboratory achievements and challenges
- Assessment of existing or new environmental surveillance sites, where appropriate
- Data assessed for consistency, anomalies, regular analysis
- Final classification; availability of results at all levels; presence of compatible cases and their investigation

#### D. Vaccine management (mandatory when mOPV has been used)
- Detailed vaccine utilisation report available
- Use of management tools; knowledge of process
- Tallying, reporting and storage of stocks at all levels
- Visual inspection of mOPV stocks
- Documentation of robust search for tOPV and mOPV2
- Recommend safe storage or disposal of mOPV2
- Signoff by national or independent authority
1. No poliovirus of the outbreak serotype detected from any source (AFP, contact, environmental...) for at least 6 months since virus last detected

AND

2. Surveillance criteria over previous 12 months met in infected/high risk areas (outbreak zone), and other areas at risk, including cross-border outbreaks1
   i) NPAFP ≥3 per 100,000 population <15 years of age (or national objective, whichever is higher)
   ii) ≥80% stool adequacy of all AFP case stool collected

AND

3. Convincing evidence that areas of high risk or with conflict, displacement, difficult to access and small populations have been identified and planned for, and that adapted strategies2 have been successfully implemented to:
   i) interrupt transmission of poliovirus
   ii) detect any ongoing poliovirus transmission

After comprehensive review of indicators, data quality, and qualitative information in the local context, the OBRA team has the responsibility to give the best possible opinion as to whether:
   i) an outbreak appears to be over, even if not all criteria are strictly met, or
   ii) an outbreak cannot be considered over, even in the absence of detectable virus isolation.

1 Criteria to be met at 1st admin level, or 2nd admin level for populous countries (e.g. India, Pakistan, Nigeria), and other high-risk areas as determined by the OBRA team

2 Strategies include: innovative vaccination outreach activities; active case search, community surveillance; estimate of population, as yet unachieved by vaccination, by surveillance

**OBRA deliverables**

1. OBRA planned and implemented
2. OBRA team provides actionable recommendations for next phase
3. National authorities briefed before departure
4. OBRA lead provides final report
   o Debriefing presentation
   o Executive summary (2 pages) to national authorities and GPEI partners
5. WHO regional office to review and advise if outbreak ongoing or over
6. Country provides post-OBRA action plan within one month

**Selected key performance indicators for OBRA**

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<td>Outbreak response timeliness</td>
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<td>Outbreak coordination</td>
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<td>Cross-border coordination, where relevant</td>
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<td>Data review and field findings consistent</td>
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<tr>
<th>SIA quality and monitoring</th>
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<td>Independent Monitoring (IM) results for last two SIAs</td>
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<td>LQAS results for last two SIAs</td>
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<td>Confidence in the results of IM and/or LQAS</td>
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<td>Special populations* covered by SIAs</td>
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<td>Response to evaluation outcomes and gaps identified</td>
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<th>Advocacy, communications and C4D</th>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence-based C4D strategy represented in outbreak</td>
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<td>response plan and implemented in timely manner</td>
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<td>Reasons for missed children, especially for refusals,</td>
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<td>are analysed from campaign data and addressed</td>
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### B. Population immunity & routine immunization

| Vaccination status of NPAFP cases, 6-59 months of age in infected and high-risk regions | • 80% NP AFP cases have ≥3 doses OPV  
• <5% cases are zero dose |
| OPV3 & IPV routine vaccination coverage for past three years (or indicate what IPV was introduced) | >90% coverage OPV3 and IPV, comment on target population (denominator), validity |
| Special populations | Evidence of targeted strategies conducted to provide RI |

### C. Surveillance, data quality & laboratory

#### AFP surveillance

| Weekly surveillance reports received at all levels (e.g. district to state, state to national, national to region) | ≥ 90% |
| NPAFP rate / children under 15 years of age / year | ≥ 3/100,000 or national objective, if higher (overall outbreak zone)  
≥ 2/100,000 (every first subnational level) |
| AFP cases investigated < 48 hours after notification | ≥ 80% |
| AFP cases with 2 specimens collected 24-48 hours apart and ≤14 days from symptom onset | ≥ 80%, also consider assessment of time between symptom onset to notification |
| NPENT isolation rate in AFP stool samples | ≥ 10% or national objective, whichever is higher |
| 60-day follow up of AFP cases with inadequate stools | Records of completed comprehensive 60-day follow-ups and documented evidence of expert review |
| Case detection in special populations* | Proportion of AFP cases from special populations, of all AFP cases, varies according to setting |

#### Environmental surveillance

| Samples collection schedule, and reporting | Environmental samples collected as per agreed collection site and frequency; results reported |
| NPENT isolation | Proportion samples positive for NPENT per site; Sabin-like isolation pattern for 2-3 months post SIA |

#### Laboratory

| Specimens arrive in accredited laboratory | ≥ 80% in good condition  
≥ 80% within ≤3 days of being sent |
| Final laboratory sequencing results available within ≤28 days of specimen receipt | ≥ 80% |

### D. Vaccine management (mandatory when mOPV has been used)

| Vaccine utilization records and validation forms | Submitted ≤14 days from end of SIA |
| Vaccine stockouts or shortages | No vaccine stockouts or shortages, adequate cold chain |

*Special populations include: refugees, IDP, migrant, nomadic, history of refusals*