Strengthening pandemic influenza preparedness and response

Report by the Secretariat

1. In resolution WHA56.19 the Health Assembly expressed concern about the general lack of preparedness for an influenza pandemic. The resolution urged Member States to draw up and implement national preparedness plans, and requested the Director-General to continue to provide leadership in pandemic preparedness, particularly by strengthening global influenza surveillance.

2. Since January 2004, events affecting both human and animal health have brought the world closer to an influenza pandemic than at any time since 1968. Whereas past pandemics have consistently announced themselves with an explosion of cases, events during 2004, supported by epidemiological and virological surveillance, have given the world an unprecedented warning that a pandemic may be imminent. They have also opened an unprecedented opportunity to enhance preparedness.

3. Given the constantly changing nature of influenza viruses, the occurrence of pandemics defies precise predictions concerning timing, causative strain, and severity of the disease and its international impact. Conditions favouring the emergence of a pandemic virus are, however, well known, and are increasingly being met. It is therefore prudent for all countries, supported by WHO, to undertake or intensify preparedness activities as a matter of urgency.

THE PANDEMIC THREAT

4. Concern that an influenza pandemic might be imminent began in January 2004, when Thailand and Viet Nam reported their first human cases of avian influenza, caused by the H5N1 strain of *Influenzavirus A*. These cases were directly linked to historically unprecedented outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in poultry that began in 2003 and rapidly affected eight Asian nations;¹ all prerequisites for the start of a pandemic were met save one: efficient human-to-human transmission.

5. Three waves of avian influenza have struck. The initial spread of H5N1 in poultry, which saw the death or destruction of more than 120 million birds, was accompanied by 35 human cases, of which 24 were fatal. The human cases occurred in Thailand and Viet Nam only, from January 2004

¹ Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Viet Nam.
through March 2004. Epidemiological investigations, conducted with WHO support, linked most human cases to direct contact with diseased poultry in household, as opposed to commercial, flocks.

6. Massive control efforts were introduced in most countries with the aim of eliminating the virus from its poultry host. The largest outbreaks among poultry, in Thailand and Viet Nam, declined sharply near the beginning of March 2004. After a brief lull, however, disease activity began to increase in July, with fresh outbreaks reported in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam. In August, Malaysia reported its first outbreak. Although the number of affected poultry has been much smaller in this second wave (less than one million), there have again been human cases. From August through October, nine cases, of which eight were fatal, were reported in Thailand (five) and Viet Nam (four).

7. A third wave of avian influenza in poultry began in December 2004 in Thailand and Viet Nam, with outbreaks also detected later in Cambodia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Indonesia. Cambodia reported its first human case, which was fatal, in early February 2005. As of mid-March 2005, Viet Nam had reported 24 human cases in this third wave, of which 15 were fatal.

8. As of mid-March 2005, the H5N1 virus has caused 74 confirmed human cases, of which 49 were fatal. Among all these cases, two features are striking: the overwhelming concentration of cases in previously healthy children and young adults, and the very high mortality. No explanation for this unusual disease pattern is presently available. Nor is it possible to calculate a reliable case-fatality rate, as mild or asymptomatic infection, now known to occur, may escape detection and no systematic study has been conducted to estimate the incidence of infection in the population at risk. Moreover, recent research shows that severe disease can occur in the absence of respiratory symptoms, further increasing the risk that some cases have been missed and suggesting that the burden of infection may be greater than indicated by reported cases.

EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

9. Although the second and third waves of outbreaks have been far less conspicuous in the numbers of human beings and animals affected, they have demonstrated several unusual features. Confirmed by findings from recent epidemiological and laboratory studies, these features suggest that the virus may be evolving in ways that increasingly favour the start of a pandemic.

10. Evidence indicates that H5N1 virus is now endemic in parts of Asia, having established a permanent ecological niche in poultry. The risk of further human cases will continue, as will opportunities for a pandemic virus to emerge. Studies comparing virus samples over time show that the H5N1 strain has become progressively more pathogenic for poultry, and is now hardier than in the past, surviving several days longer in the environment. Evidence further suggests that H5N1 virus is expanding its mammalian host range. For example, the virus has recently been shown to cause severe disease and deaths in species, including captive tigers (Pantera tigris) and experimentally infected domestic cats, not previously considered susceptible to disease caused by any influenza A virus.

11. Another surprising finding is the detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus in dead migratory birds. Wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses and have historically carried these viruses, in evolutionary equilibrium, without showing symptoms or succumbing to disease. Most recently, asymptomatic domestic ducks have been shown to excrete highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, suggesting an important silent role in maintaining transmission. As these ducks can excrete large quantities of lethal virus without the warning signal of visible illness, it has become difficult to give
rural residents realistic advice on how to avoid exposure. The role of domestic ducks as a silent reservoir of H5N1 virus may help to explain why several recent human cases could not be traced to contact with diseased poultry.

12. The present concentration of outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry in rural areas, where most households maintain free-ranging flocks and ducks and chickens mingle freely, is of particular concern, especially as households depend on these birds for income and food. Such outbreaks may escape detection, are difficult to control, and increase the likelihood of human exposures, which may occur when children play in areas shared by poultry or when families slaughter or prepare birds for consumption.

13. Investigation of the most recent cases in Viet Nam suggests some new patterns of infection, including more clusters of cases possibly involving limited human-to-human transmission, cases in older patients with mild or asymptomatic infection, the first case in a health-care worker, and the first case in an agricultural worker. Most of these new developments have occurred in a single province in the northern part of the country.

ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT

14. Taken together, these changes in the ecology of the disease and behaviour of the virus have created multiple opportunities for a pandemic virus to emerge, either after a reassortment event, when genetic material is exchanged between human and avian viruses during coinfection of a human being or pig, or through a more gradual process of adaptive mutation. Nobody can predict how the present situation will evolve. Experts readily agree, however, that H5N1 virus has demonstrated considerable pandemic potential. With the virus now endemic, the probability that this potential will be realized has increased.

15. Of the three pandemics of the previous century, those beginning in 1957 and 1968 caused large numbers of cases and a combined mortality estimated at more than three million deaths, mostly in the very young, the elderly and people with underlying chronic conditions. In stark contrast, the 1918 pandemic probably caused more than 40 million deaths, mainly in persons aged 15 to 35 years. The reasons for this exceptional lethality are not fully understood.

16. The present situation may resemble that leading to the 1918 pandemic. Similarities between the H5N1 and 1918 viruses have been suggested in the gradual adaptation of an avian to a human-like virus, the severity of disease, its concentration in young and healthy people, and the occurrence of primary viral pneumonia in addition to secondary bacterial pneumonia (which responds to antibiotics). It should be remembered, however, that an avian influenza virus would probably lose pathogenicity when it acquires the improved transmissibility needed to ignite a pandemic. More relevant to preparedness planning is the fact that no virus of the H5 subtype has probably ever circulated among human beings, and certainly not within the lifetime of today’s world population; population vulnerability to an H5N1-like pandemic virus is universal.

17. Experts regard pandemic influenza as one of the most significant global public health emergencies caused by a naturally occurring pathogen. Although the timing of this event cannot be predicted, rapid international spread is certain once a virus with the appropriate characteristics appears. Historically, pandemics have travelled along sea lanes, with global spread completed within six to eight months. As demonstrated by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), spread along the routes of international air travel can shorten this time considerably. The speed of international spread has no
direct effect on mortality, but could compromise response capacity should large parts of the world experience almost simultaneous outbreaks. Many of the public health interventions that successfully contained SARS will not be effective against a disease that is far more contagious, has a short incubation period, and can be transmitted before the onset of symptoms. Apart from causing a surge of cases requiring health care, such rapid contagion typically results in a crippling shortage of workers in health care and other essential services. The resulting social and economic disruption may be greater in today’s closely interconnected and interdependent world. For these reasons, every effort must be made to take advantage of the present unique opportunity for intensified preparedness.

18. By May 2004, the three complementary objectives for the international public health response were considered to be: to avert a pandemic, to control the human outbreaks and prevent further spread, and to conduct the research needed for better preparedness and response, including the immediate development of a vaccine against the pandemic virus. The subsequent evolution of events has forced reconsideration of these three objectives.

19. Prospects for averting a pandemic initially depended on elimination of the virus in its animal reservoir. Despite massive control efforts, outbreaks in poultry have continued. Field investigations of recent cases indicate that rural farmers and their families are the most important risk group. Governments in affected countries must continue to reach these people with information, appropriate to rural farming practices, on dangerous behaviours to avoid. Investigations have linked some recent cases to the practice, common among rural subsistence farmers, of killing and eating poultry once birds within a flock show signs of disease or start to die. Rapid detection and culling of infected birds remain essential. Opportunities for the successful treatment of patients are reduced by the tendency of cases to be detected late in the course of the illness. Work on the development of a vaccine against a pandemic virus has moved forward, but not with a speed appropriate to the urgency of the situation.

PREPAREDNESS MEASURES

20. Vaccines are the most important intervention for preventing influenza and reducing its health consequences during a pandemic. In November 2004, WHO convened a meeting to explore ways to expedite the development of a vaccine against a pandemic virus. All the major influenza vaccine manufacturers were represented. The meeting specifically considered what needs to be done by industry, regulatory authorities, governments and WHO to make such vaccines available rapidly and in as large a quantity as possible.

21. Several manufacturers are engaged in development of a vaccine against a pandemic virus, and various strategies, both short-term and long-term, are being pursued. As a new vaccine for seasonal influenza is produced almost every year, the steps required for vaccine development, licensing and production are familiar to both industry and regulatory agencies. The H5N1 virus, however, raises special problems, including its threat to personnel at manufacturing sites and its lethal effect on embryonated chicken eggs, the current standard medium in vaccine production. Specific problems involve more complex production technologies, heightened biosafety requirements, intellectual property rights for patented technologies, liability for adverse reactions, and some regulatory complexities.

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22. As agreed during the meeting, all these problems can be solved through a collaborative effort involving governments, industry and academia; roles and responsibilities for doing so were identified. Some solutions depend on public funding; others require research support; still others will benefit from international coordination by WHO. To gain time, the meeting identified several activities that can be undertaken now to lay the groundwork for rapid marketing authorization and production of a safe and effective vaccine once a pandemic starts.

23. The greatest problem is the inadequacy of supplies to meet global needs. Manufacturing capacity is finite and cannot be expanded quickly. Should a pandemic begin now, no company could meet its production targets. Resolution WHA56.19 noted that better use of vaccines for seasonal epidemics will help to ensure that manufacturing capacity meets demand in a future pandemic, and set a goal for improved coverage of the elderly population during seasonal epidemics. Even though this approach is considered to be the best long-term strategy for expanding the manufacturing base for all influenza vaccines, more immediate solutions are needed.

24. High priority has been given to the investigation of strategies that economize on the use of antigen. Intradermal vaccination might extend vaccine supply several-fold. Inclusion of an adjuvant in the vaccine formulation could enhance the effectiveness of antigen in low doses, thus making the most of limited antigen supplies and limited manufacturing capacity. Such strategies currently represent the best hope that countries without manufacturing facilities will have some access to a vaccine against a pandemic virus. At the start of a pandemic, manufacturers will halt production of trivalent seasonal vaccines (protective against three strains) and begin manufacturing of a monovalent vaccine protective against the pandemic virus only, thus greatly increasing the number of doses that can be produced during a given time. Two doses may, however, be needed to assure protection in immunologically naïve populations.

25. Manufacturing capacity for influenza vaccines is concentrated in Australia, Europe, Japan and North America. Vaccine development is undertaken by companies and governments in these areas, but the need for a vaccine will be global. It is expected that, should a pandemic begin, countries with manufacturing facilities will regulate production nationally.

26. Antigen protective against the H5 virus subtype can be produced in bulk and stored. In the past, a vaccine against pandemic influenza could not have been stockpiled in advance because it was not possible to predict which of the 13 non-human influenza virus subtypes would be the causative strain. However, in view of the pandemic potential of the H5N1 virus in Asia, stockpiling of a vaccine for use in a pandemic caused by the H5N1 strain is an option for pandemic preparedness, and this approach is being pursued or considered by some countries. Even if the actual pandemic H5 subtype virus shows mutational changes when compared with the current H5N1 strain, a vaccine that is protective against infection due to that strain could confer almost as much protection. Stockpiles of an H5N1 vaccine would be useful in the early phase of a pandemic when large-scale production of a vaccine has not yet been initiated.

27. Antiviral agents, which can be stockpiled in advance, have important but different roles, both now and at the start of a pandemic. These roles are, however, constrained by high costs and limited supplies. There are three opportunities for using antiviral medications, some of which are considered effective against H5N1 infection in humans. In the first such set of circumstances, these medicines can be used to treat H5N1-infected patients and to prevent infection in close contacts, including family members and health-care workers; this is currently being put into practice. As all antiviral agents need to be administered shortly after the onset of symptoms, a critical problem is the tendency of cases to be detected late in the course of their illness.
28. A second opportunity to use antiviral agents arises when surveillance indicates that the transmissibility of the virus is beginning to become more efficient. Administration of medications to all members of a community in which clusters of cases are occurring might either stop the virus from further improving its transmissibility or delay international spread.

29. The third opportunity presents once a pandemic has been declared. Pending the availability of vaccines, antiviral agents will be the principal medical intervention for reducing morbidity and mortality, which becomes the most important priority once a pandemic is under way. Several countries are now stockpiling antiviral medications, and these advance orders are expected to drive expansion of manufacturing capacity for the future. Increased capacity will place the world in a better position to respond to any future pandemic caused by any influenza virus.

30. A wide range of non-medical interventions, such as improved personal hygiene, quarantine, contact tracing and travel restrictions, can potentially reduce opportunities for transmission at the start of a pandemic and slow international spread. They have relevance to all countries. Consideration of their use during a pandemic is particularly important, as they will be the principal protective tools, pending the augmentation of vaccine supplies. WHO has issued recommendations concerning the use of more than 30 non-medical interventions at different phases during the progression from a pre-pandemic situation to declaration of a pandemic.\(^1\) As another measure of their importance, any slowing of international spread at the start of a pandemic gains time to increase vaccine supplies; each day gained could mean an additional five million doses of vaccine.

31. Another WHO consultation, held in December 2004, recommended several revisions to the WHO preparedness plan for an influenza pandemic.\(^2\) This document, which forms the basis for most national preparedness plans, presents a phased approach, in which sequential epidemiological events trigger a range of national and international activities, including those required for vaccine development. Revisions take into account the additional levels of alert and related activities needed when the threat of a pandemic arises from an outbreak in animals, and will be particularly useful in countries experiencing outbreaks of avian influenza in animals.

32. Given the seriousness of the present situation, all countries need to undertake preparedness activities. In affected countries, a high level of vigilance for clusters of cases of respiratory disease provides an early warning mechanism important for all countries. The best opportunity for international collaboration to improve preparedness and to expedite vaccine development is now, before the start of a pandemic.

33. The Executive Board discussed influenza pandemic preparedness and response at its 115th session.\(^3\) The Board recognized the seriousness of the threat to all countries and underscored the need to intensify preparedness measures in a spirit of global solidarity. Great concern was expressed over the inadequate availability and affordability of vaccines and antiviral medicines. WHO support was

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\(^3\) See document EB115/2005/REC/2, summary record of the eleventh meeting, section 1.
requested in this area, in maintaining its intensified global alert and warning system, and in continuing to communicate information rapidly.

**ACTION BY THE HEALTH ASSEMBLY**

34. The Health Assembly is invited to consider the draft resolution contained in resolution EB115.R16.